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THE BEGINNINGS OF A LAW FOR THE AIR
This article aspires to give such boundaries as the subject will
permit to a branch of the law so recent in its origin that its termi-
nology is still in dispute. For the present we shall designate as "air
law" that developing group of legal principles which apply to the
occupancy, use and navigation of the air. But the difficulties which
this definition encounters will be apparent as we proceed, and our
excuse for its present employment is that it describes the matter
in familiar terms.
The discovery of new arts and instrumentalities has always ex-
erted powerful influence upon the trend of the development of law
So it is that in our time the invention and perfection of aircraft and
of the radio transmitter and receiver have compelled the formula-
tion of a law for the air.' This air law found ready made and
properly adaptable to the new use, many familiar concepts, and
these will be given little more than passing notice. But on the other
hand, air law presents some problems of sovereignty, jurisdiction
and the limitations of private property which are unique and
largely incapable of solution by direct application or analogy of the
common law
There are, as yet, few celebrated cases in this field. To be sure,
man has for many years penetrated the upper air in captive or free
balloons, has made some sort of use of the air above the land of
another by firing projectiles through it, 2 and under the "ancient
lights" doctrine of the English common law has been protected in
the enjoyment of a prescriptive right to light transmitted through
this medium across the land of adjacent owners.3 These relationships
or uses have given rise to actions in which the incidents of the own-
ership of the soil as extended upward have been asserted. The
adjudications in such actions have been frequently employed as a
supposed basis for the genesis of air law But a reading of those
decisions we believe will bring conviction that their writers would
be quite unwilling to extend the doctrines announced to new de-
vices and to the then unknown potentialities of the air medium.
The Wright brothers of Dayton, Ohio, inventors of the airplane, dem-
onstrated their machine in actual flight for the first time on December 17,
1903. The use of the air medium for communication dates from Marconi's
establishment of wireless communication over a distance of four miles
in 1897.
2 As an example only of many cases up this subject see Clifton v. Vis-
count Bury (1887), IV Times Law Reports 8.
' See a full discussion of this doctrine in a decision of the House of
Lords, Coils v. Home and Colonial Stores, Ltd., 1904 Law Reports, Appeal
Cases, p. 179. 90 L. T. 687.
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FREEDo OF THE AIR
As we endeavor in a general way to mark off the limits of the
jurisdictions pertaining to the air, we commence with that which
having the most extensive physical boundaries yet offers the least
complexity with respect to the subject in hand-we refer to the air
above the high seas.
The freedom of the sea-the principle that beyond territorial
waters and such marine zones as exist by reason of a coast state
exercising authority to prevent violation or evasion of its laws, the
open sea is the common highway of nations and is not subject to
any sovereignty,---is now a universally recognized rule of inter-
national law 4 Although the first expressions of the rule are found
in the Roman law, it was Hugo Grotius who first announced it in
its modern form. In 1580 Spain was protesting the voyage of dis-
covery made by the English navigator Drake, who had picked a
quarrel with the Spaniards in the Pacific Ocean. To these protests
Queen Elizabeth made answer to the Spanish ambassador Mandoza,
as follows:5
"Neither nature nor public interest permit the exclusive
possession of the sea by a single nation or private indivi-
dual, the ocean is free to everybody, no legal titles exist
whatever that would grant its possession to anyone in par-
ticular, neither nature nor usage permit its seizure, the
domains of the sea and of the air are common property of
all men."
So far as her statement refers to the domain of the air, we cannot
accord to the good Queen the prescience which her pronouncement
imported. But at this day "all are agreed that over the free seas the
air is free."6
In the evolution of air law, however, this principle of the freedom
of the air over the high seas came to have in theory a wholly un-
warranted extension and one which eventually had to be abandoned.
Partly by reason of the fact that the air at no great distance above
the earth had the physical aspect of the vast open sea, and partly
by reason of a supposed analogy in contemplation of law, there
arose a school of thought which proposed a universal freedom of the
air above both land and sea.7 But this doctrine of the universal
freedom of the air fell soon under the weight of practical considera-
tions, for aircraft, like skips, must come to port. The World War
I Meurer, The Program of the Freedom of the Sea, p. 13.
Meurer, supra, p. 11.
'American Journal of International Law, Vol. IV p. 113 (article by
Kuhn)
I For a bibliography on this subject see Hyde, International Law, Vol. I,
p. 324, note 2.
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also brought forcefully to attention the fact that aircraft in flight
were always potential invaders of the domain of the sovereign
beneath.
THE CINA
In these days when both oceans have been crossed in non-stop
flights, it is easier to understand the compulsion which brought
about a further development in air law The geographically compact
group of nations which we refer to as the Continent, have been for
some time capable of being crossed in a single flight. As a direct
result of the World War the air frontiers of these nations were
closed to all foreign aircraft. This condition was intolerable. It was
apparent to all that the development of practical navigation of the
air required the opening of the air frontiers. The Cina was the out-
growth of this situation.
The Cina is an international agreement respecting flight, dated
October 13, 1919. It takes its name from the French title of the
agreement, Convention Internationale de Navigation Aerienne.
Ratification of or adherence to its provisions has been made by the
following states Belgium, Great Britain and the British Dominions
and India, France, Greece, Japan, Portugal, Jugo-Slavia, Siam,
Persia, Italy, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Roumania, Uruguay, Po-
land, Chile, The Saar Territory, Sweden, Denmark, The Nether-
lands and Panama.8 However, the Cina (convention) enunciated
some principles of first magnitude in the domain of international
air navigation which are worthy of consideration.
THE AIR SOVEREIGNTY OF NATIONS
The very first article of the Cina provides as follows "The high
contracting parties recognize that every Power has complete and
exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its territory " It is to
be noted that the subject of the sovereignty asserted is "air space"
and not "air" A little reflection will suggest the aptness of this
choice of terms. The air or atmosphere above the land of any particu-
lar proprietor is a continually changing thing, but the air space
above given land is capable of at least approximate boundary later-
ally The sovereignty of every power over its air space is declared to
be" complete and exclusive" Here is the explicit renunciation of the
doctrine of universal freedom of the air. The second article is
81t is a rather long and complicated document (9 chapters and 8 appen-
dices) and no digest of its provisions will be attempted here. The reader
who is interested in the text is referred to the reprint in Official Bulletin
No. 11, December, 1926, of the International Commission for Air Navi-
gation.
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equally noteworthy It provides m part as follows. "Each contract-
mg State undertakes in time of peace to accord freedom of innocent
passage above its territory to the aircraft of the other contracting
States. " There should be read m connection with the foregoing
article, a portion of the tirty-second article as follows "No mili-
tary aircraft of a contracting State shall fly over the territory of
another contracting State nor land thereon without special authori-
zation. " The term "innocent passage" is borrowed from
international law That law conceives a maritime state as having a
zone of territorial waters along its seacoast separating such coast
from the high seas. The littoral state is upheld in asserting a
measure of jurisdiction over these territorial waters for purposes
of self-protection. On the other hand, the territorial waters are
said to be subject to a servitude or easement of innocent passage
in favor of the merchant-ships of foreign nations. A famous inter-
national lawyer has put the matter tersely as follows - "Warships
may not pass without consent into this zone, because they threaten.
Merchant-ships may pass and repass because they do not threaten."
The significance, then, of the quoted portions of articles two and
thirty-two of the Cina is that the high contracting parties have
created thereby a mutual right of passage for non-military aircraft.
Reverting now to the declaration of sovereignty over air space
as asserted in the first article of the Cina, we wish to call attention
to similar expressions in later enactments. The British Air Naviga-
tion Act of 1920 commences with this declaration :10
"Whereas the full and absolute sovereignty and rightful
jurisdiction of His Majesty extends, and has always ex-
tended, over the air superincumbent on all parts of His
Majesty's dominions and the territorial waters adjacent
thereto-be it therefore enacted by the King's most
Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of
the Lord's Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this
present Parliament assembled and by the authority of the
same, as follows. "
Our nation has likewise proclaimed its sovereignty over air space
in Article 6 of the Air Commerce Act of 1926 which reads in part
as follows :"1
"The Congress hereby declares that the Government of
the United States has, to the exclusion of all foreign
nations, complete sovereignty of the air space over the
lands and waters of the United States, including the
Canal Zone."
Argument of Mr. Elihu Root in XI Proceedings, North Atlantic Fish-
eries Arbitration, p. 2006.
'The British Air Navigation Act of 1920-Public General Acts, 10 and
11 George V Chap. 80, p. 540.
"Air Commerce Act of 1926--44 Stat, at L. 568, U. S. C. A. Supp. 1927,
Tit. 49, sec. 171-184.
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The Uniform State Law of Aeronautics, now adopted in its
entirety or with but slight changes by twenty-one states and
Hawaii, 2 declares in Section 2 as follows13
"Sovereignty in the space above the lands and waters
of this state is declared to rest in the State, except where
granted to and assumed by the United States pursuant to
a constitutional grant from the people of this state."
In fact declarations of complete national sovereignty in the air
space are now so numerous as to give foundation to the belief that
this principle will soon become universal.
So far our discussion of the Cina bears upon its regulation of
international aviation. Its effect upon the national law of the
nations parties thereto is quite as important. That the private law
regulating the operation of aircraft should be uniform as nearly
as may be, is highly desirable. If the attitude toward the de-
velopment of flight is a friendly one, the ever increasing range of
such flights demands the elimination of conflicting provisions
which would render passage over territory foreign to that of the
nationality of the aircraft not feasible. Accordingly the Cina con-
tains uniform regulations upon the following subjects nationality
of aircraft (Chap. II) and their marking (Annex A), certificates
of the airworthiness of the craft and competency of the operating
crew (Chap. III and Annexes B and E), log books required to be
carried (Annex C), lights, signals and rules for air traffic
(Annex D), aeronautical maps and the legends thereon and ground
markings (Annex F), rules, codes and color scheme for meteoro-
logical information (Annex G), and customs rules (Annex H)
Because of the completeness of these regulations it will be seen that
they immensely facilitate a flight which goes beyond the boundaries
of the state of departure, as well as affording a great measure of
protection to the states flown over.
The Cina is a by-product of the Treaty of Versailles. The signers
of that treaty are, with few exceptions, the signers of the Cina. As
the World War had closed the air frontiers, so the establishment of
peace argued loudly for their re-opening. The greater speed, ceiling
and lifting capacity of the aircraft developed during the war
helped to strengthen the demand that the domain of this new
vehicle of transport be international. The Cina was the outgrowth
of this situation. The administrative machinery which it creates
1 Cf. "A Survey of State Aeronautical Legislation," by Fred D. Fagg,
Jr., Professor of Law Northwestern University School of Law Journal of
Air Law Vol. 1, p. 452.
11 The text of the Uniform State Law of Aeronautics will be found in
Zollman, "Law of the Air," p. 260 et seq., and Logan, "Aircraft Law-Made
Plain," p. 109 et seq.
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is operated by a permanent International Commission for Air Navi-
gation under the direction of the League of Nations (Chap. VIII).
Doubtless therein lies the reason why the United States, while a
signatory of the Cina, has never ratified it. The arguments
advanced in opposition to ratification are substantially the same
as those in opposition to ratification of the Treaty of Versailles.
To give a complete picture of international air law agreements,
it is necessary to mention two other conventions. The Ibero-
American Convention was prepared in a conference called by the
Spanish Government at Madrid in 1926. The conferees included
Spain, Portugal and South American countries, as well as some of
the signatories of the Cina. The Ibero-American and the Cina con-
ventions are practically identical. The Pan-American Convention,
signed in Havana, February 20, 1928, has been ratified by only
four nations, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama, and is
not yet effective. It is quite different from the other two conven-
tions. The United States and Canada have entered into a reciprocal
arrangement, effected by a note dated August 29, 1929, from our
Secretary of State and the reply of the Minister of the Dominion
of Canada of October 22, 1929, which arrangement provides for
(1) the admission in to the one country of civil aircraft of the
other country, (2) the issuance by each country of pilot licenses to
nationals of the other, and (3) the acceptance by each country of
certificates of airworthiness in connection with aircraft imported
from the other country as merchandise.14
AN ANCIENT MAxIm-GRouNi PROPRIETORSHIP
The early discussions of air law were much involved with attempts
to define the rights of the ground proprietor in the superincumbent
air space, and a considerable vestige of the controversy still remains.
Literally volumes have been written upon this subject and a biblio-
graphy would fill many pages. The core of this controversy is the
meaning of the maxm cuius est solum eaus est usque ad coelum
(Whoever owns the soil owns also to the sky) It is heartening to
those who endeavor to discover the meaning of this maxim to know
that an eminent English authority 15 has said that "no English
judge or writer has ever satisfactorily expounded the matter." The
maxim is of considerable age. Sir George Croke reporting the case
of Bury against Pope' 6 adds a note referring to the maxim as of
"For a complete account of negotiations with Canada see article by
Stephen Latchford, "Technical Assistant, Treaty Division, Department of
State, Washington, D. C., appearing in Journal of Air Law, Vol. II, No. 3 p.
335 (July, 1931).
15 Dr. Arnold D. McNair, Fellow and Senior Tutor of Gonville and Calus
College, and Lecturer in Law in the University of Cambridge, England.
" Crokes K. B. Reports, Vol. 1, part 1, p. 118, Cro. Eliz. 118 (1587).
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the time of Edward I, the English Justinian (1272-1307) But its
origin, as many writers believe, may have occurred much earlier.
Certain it is that at the time the first edition of Lord Coke's
"Commentary Upon Littleton" appeared in 1628, the maxim
had attained some degree of currency, for that writer says.1 "And
lastly, the earth hath in law a great extent upwards, not only of
water, as hath been said, but of ayre and all other things even up to
heaven, for cujus est solum eaus est usque ad coelum." In 1765 Sir
William Blackstone commenced the publication of his "Commen-
taries" in which he said-8
"Land hath also, in its legal signification, an indefinite
extent, upwards as well as downwards. Culus est solum
e3us est usque ad coelum, is the maxim of the law, upwards,
therefore no man may erect any building, or the like, to
overhang another's land by the name of land, which is
iiomen generalhsssmum, everything terrestrial will pass."
Therefore, the maxim began to be quoted and applied by the
English judges.
An examination of a few of these cases as representative of the
trend of the English judicial thought is in point. These cases gener
ally are concerned with the question whether invasion of the air space
above land is (a) nuisance or (b) trespass. And it is well in this
connection, without going into refinements of pleading, to recall
the essential difference between the two sorts of injury as they
affect real property and the actions for their redress. For our pres-
ent purpose it is sufficient to remember that a nuisance, with
reference to real property, is" "anything done to the hurt or annoy-
ance of the lands, tenements or hereditaments of another" and that
it is necessary in such action to show actual damage resulting from
the acts complained of, while in trespass on realty a showing that
the possession of the complainant has been disturbed is sufficient
to support the action. Accordingly, if air space be capable of
possession in the sense that land can be possessed, we should find
the English judges holding that the invasion of air space is trespass.
And by the same token air space, in legal contemplation, is part of
the subjacent land. In Fay v. Prentwe20 , plaintiff recovered dam-
ages by reason of the adjoining owner having erected a cornice
projecting into the air space above plaintiff's land, from which
cornice, it was alleged, rain fell upon and damaged plaintiff's land.
The court treated the injury as a nuisance. Being urged by one of
"Day's Ed. Book 1, Cap. 1, sec. 1, 4a.
"Blackstone-Commentaries on the Laws of England, 2nd Ed., Vol. II,
p. 18.
19 Blackstone's Commentaries, Vol. III, p. 216.
14 L. S. (C. P.) 298, 1 C. B. 828 (1845)
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the serjeants to treat the matter as trespass, Coltman, J said.
"But conceding that under certain circumstances such an act
would amount to a trespass, there is nothing on this record
which shows it to have been so. It may be the presumption of law
that the space from the earth to the sky belongs to the owner of the
soil, but this is a mere presumption, and not a matter of fact, and
there is no allegation in this declaration that the plaintiff had this
extensive right." Penruddock's Case (1598) , 1 and Baten's Case
(1610),22 are very like the facts of Pay v. Prentice and are cited
therein as authority supporting the decision. These cases indicate a
judicial reluctance to concede an ownership or possession of air
space. In Pickermng v. Rudd (1815),23 the plaintiff sued m tres-
pass because the defendant had nailed upon his house a board,
which projected over the plaintiff's garden. Lord Ellenborough
said. "I do not think it is a trespass to interfere with the column
of air superincumbent on the close," and the jury found for the
defendant. But the remarks of the court obiter are most interesting.
Continuing, he said
"I once had occasion to rule upon the circuit, that a
man who, from the outside of a field, discharged a gun into
it, so as that the shot must have struck the soil, was guilty
of breaking and entering it. A very learned judge, who
went the circuit with me, at first doubted the decision, but
I believe he afterwards approved of it, and that it met with
the general concurrence of those to whom it was mentioned.
But I am by no means prepared to say, that firing across
a field in vacuo, no part of the contents touching it,
amounts to a clausum fregit. Nay, if this board overhang-
mg the plaintiff's garden be a trespass, it would follow
that an aeronaut is liable to an action of trespass quare
clausum fregit, at the suit of the occupier of every field
over which Ins balloon passes in the course of his voyage."
Lord Ellenborough's reference to an aeronaut may well have
been suggested by historical events which were then of very recent
occurrence. In the Napoleonic campaigns which culminated in the
Battle of Waterloo fought on June 18, 1815, balloons had been
employed to obtain information concerning the position of the
enemy 24
In 1865 occurred the case of Kenyon v. Hart.25 The facts of the
case involving an alleged trespass by one going upon the land of an-
other to retrieve a pheasant which he had killed, do not make it in
= 5 Coke's Reports 100, 77 Eng. Repts (Reprint) 210.
9 Coke's Report 53, 77 Eng. Repts. (Reprint) 810.
4 Campbell's Reports, 219, 1 Stark, 56.
21 Hazeltine, The Law of the Air, p. 66.
26 Best & Smith 249, 11 L. T- 733.
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point in our present inquiry But Blackburn, J alluding, as the re-
porter conceives, to the reference made by Lord Ellenborough to an
aeronaut in Pickersng v. Rudd, supra, and the doubt which His
Lordship entertained that the passage of a balloon over the land was
a trespass, says "I understand the good sense of that doubt, though
not the legal reason of it." In other words Blackburn was still of
opinion that the ad coelum maxim should be taken literally
In Corbett v. Hilt (1870)26 plaintiff owned two adjoining pieces
of real property and conveyed one of them to defendant. The
structure upon the property which plaintiff retained projected over
the property conveyed. The defendant commenced to build upon the
property conveyed to him in such manner as to avoid the projection
and erect above it. The plaintiff brought trespass, but judgment was
for the defendant, Sir W M. James, V C., holding that "The
ordinary rule of law is, that whoever has got the solum-whoever
has got the site-is the owner of everything up to the sky and down
to the centre of the earth." Although many more cases like the fore-
going might be cited, those already discussed are sufficient to indi-
cate the diversity of opinion among the early English judges con-
cerning the ad coelum maxim.
We believe a reading of the various statements of the maxim, the
remarks of commentators, and the discussions of judges and text
writers lead to the following conclusions
1. That the maxim crept into the law by reason of the profuse-
ness of early writers in describing the incidents of the ownership
of real property-the conception of ownership extending indefi-
nitely upward being an attractive exaggeration to enforce the
thought of the completeness of the dominion of the proprietor.
2. That since its origin far antedates any use of the air or air
space such as we know, it could not possibly have the meaning some-
times attributed to it.
3. That its judicial application has been largely, if not entirely,
in the solution of problems arising in connection with structures
upon or attachments to the soil, or the passage of objects over the
soil in close proximity thereto, as distinguished from the flight of
aircraft at considerable distance above the ground.
This controversy over the meaning and application of the
ad coelum maxim so far as it applies to flight of aircraft has happily
been stopped in Great Britain by the enactment of The British Air
Navigation Act of 1920 already referred to in its international
" 9 Equity Cases (L. R.) 671, 22 L. T. 263.
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aspect. 27 The provisions of this Act as it affects the national law
of Great Britain are no less important. Section 9 reads in part as
follows.
"(1) No action shall lie in respect of trespass or in re-
spect of nuisance, by reason only of the flight of aircraft
over any property at a height above the ground, which,
having regard to wind, weather, and all the circumstances
of the case is reasonable, or the ordinary incidents of such
flight, so long as the provisions of this Act and any Order
made thereunder and of the Convention are duly complied
with, but where material damage or loss is caused by an
aircraft in flight, taking off, or landing, or by any person
in any such aircraft, or by any article falling from any
such aircraft, to any person or property on land or water,
damages shall be recoverable from the owner of the air-
craft in respect of such damage or loss, without proof of
negligence or intention or other cause of action, as though
the same had been caused by his wilful act, neglect or de-
fault, except where the damage or loss was caused by or
contributed to by the negligence of the person by whom the
same was suffered. "2
This is tantamount to saying that the aviator may fly, but that
the owner of the aircraft is liable for any damage to persons or
property on the ground as though the damage were in fact wilful,
unless the damage was caused or contributed to by the person
injured. To state the matter another way and to emphasize how it
abrogates the ad coelum maxim so far as flight is concerned,28 there
is no legal liability for mere flight over the land of another at rea-
sonable height and in a reasonable manner, but absolute liability of
the owner for damage to person or property on the land unless
caused or contributed to by the person injured. 9
Coming now to the situation in the United States, the Uniform
State Law of Aeronautics previously referred to reiterates the doc-
trine of the ad coelum maxim, but in modified form. The pertinent
sections of this law read as follows.
"Section 3. Ownership of Space.
"The ownership of the space above the lands and waters
of this state is declared to be vested in the several owners
of the surface beneath, subject to the right of flight de-
scribed in Section 4."
"Section 4. Lawfulness of Flight.
"Flight in aircraft over the lands and waters of this
"See note 10 supra.
For a comparatively recent decision in the High Court of Justice,
Chancery Division, applying the ad coeZum maxim to a projecting sign in
holding it to be a trespass, see Gifford v. Dent (1926), weekly Notes 336.
"What is said to be the first case arising under the British Air Naviga-
tion Act of 1920-Roedean School Ltd. v. The Cornwall Aviation Co., Ltd.
-is commented upon in The Solicitor's Journal (Eng.) July 10, 1926.
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state is lawful, unless at such a low altitude as to interfere
with the then existing use to which the land or water, or
the space over the land or water, is put by the owners, or
unless so conducted as to be imminently dangerous to per-
sons or property lawfully on the land or water beneath.
The landing of an aircraft on the lands or waters of
another, without his consent, is unlawful, except in the
case of a forced landing. For damages caused by a forced
landing, however, the owner or lessee of the aircraft or the
aeronaut shall be liable, as provided by Section 5."
"Section 5. Damage on Land.
"The owner of every aircraft which is operated over the
lands or waters of this state is absolutely liable for injuries
to persons or property on the land or water beneath, caused
by the ascent, descent, or flight of the aircraft, or the drop-
ping or falling of any object therefrom, whether such
owner was negligent or not, unless the injury is cause in
whole or in part by the negligence of the person injured,
or of the owner or bailee of the property injured. If the
aircraft is leased at the time of the injury to person or
property, both owner and lessee shall be liable, and they
may be sued jointly, or either or both may be sued sepa-
rately An aeronaut who is not the owner or lessee shall
be liable only for the consequences of his own negligence.
The injured person, or owner, or bailee of the injured
property, shall have a lien on the aircraft causing the
injury to the extent of the damage caused by the aircraft
or objects falling from it."
The ground proprietor's ownership of the air space above is as-
serted, but flight through such air space is declared to be lawful
unless at such low altitude as to interfere "with the then existing
use" or "unless so conducted as to be imminently dangerous"
The liability imposed by Section 5, supra, is essentially the abso-
lute liability of the British Air Navigation Act of 1920. It cannot
yet be assumed that the conception of ownership of air space, law-
fulness of flight, and the attendant liability as embodied in the
sections of the uniform law quoted above will become universal in
this country The standing committee on aeronautical law of the
American Bar Association reporting to that body at its 1931 meet-
ing, submitted a uniform aeronautical code which contains some
important changes with respect to the matters we are considering.
Section 3, supra, is purposely omitted because, as the committee
believes, "the statement as to ownership of air space proclaims a
legal untruth." To take the place of Section 4, supra, Section 1 of
the proposed uniform code contains a provision on "Lawfulness of
Flight" as follows
AIR LAW
"Section 1. Lawfulness of Flight.
"Flight in aircraft over the lands and waters of this
state, within the "Navigable Air Space," as hereinafter
defined, is lawful unless at such a low altitude as to inter-
fere with the then existing use to winch the land or water
or space over the land or water is put by the owner, or
unless so -conducted as to be imminently dangerous to
persons or property lawfully on the land or water beneath.
"As used in this act, the term "Navigable Air Space"
means air space above the minimum safe altitudes of fight
prescribed by regulation by the State Aeronautical Com-
mission (or State Adminstering Officer). Such navigable
air space is subject to a public right of air navigation in
conformity with the provisions of this act and with the
regulations and Air Traffic Rules issued by the State
Aeronautical Commission (or State Administering Offi-
cer)."
It is the thought of the framers of the code that the rule providing
minimum safe altitudes of flight should not only be uniform among
the several states but should also conform to the rule on the same
subject promulgated by Federal authority Effective September
19, 1930, the Department of Commerce prescribed the following
rule
"Section 69.
"The minimum safe altitudes of flight in taking off or
landing, and while flying over the property of another in
taking off or landing, are those at winch such flights by
aircraft may be made without being in dangerous prox-
imity to persons or property on the land or water be-
neath, or unsafe to the aircraft.
"Minimum safe altitudes of flight over congested parts
of cities, towns or settlements are those sufficient to per-
mit of a reasonably safe emergency landing, but in no case
less than 1,000 feet.
"Minimum safe altitudes of flight in all other cases
shall be not less than 500 feet."
Comparing Section 4, supra, of the uniform state law with Sec-
tion 1, supra, of the proposed uniform code, it is evident that the
latter section more clearly describes the air space in winch flight is
lawful. The Federal minimum -safe altitude regulation, supra, is
particularly noteworthy because of its treatment of flight in taking
off and landing. From the standpoint of the operator of aircraft
(and until such time as heavier-than-air machines which rise ver-
tically become prevalent for commercial use), it is essential that
flight under some conditions be lawful at the very low altitudes
required for taking off and landing. The Federal regulation, supra,
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alms to permit the ascent and descent, but to limit such permission
by considerations of safety
Except as broadly suggested in what has been said respecting the
limitations on the right of flight, we will not discuss herein the
various sorts of legal liability, both of contract and of tort, which
arise through navigation of the air space. 0 The precedents per-
taining to particular classes of liabilities on which actions may be
maintained are as yet inconsiderable. Certainly they are not pres-
ently numerous enough to be cited as rules of decision. But we can-
not doubt that rules adequate for the protection of personal and
property rights in the new situations created by use of the air
space will evolve. The body of our law as it exists today, both that
which is inherited and that which is indigenous, manifests a re-
markable adaptability to changing time and circumstance. At
least from the time of the Statute of Westminister II,31 English
law and our law have evinced a purpose that no wrong should be
without a mode of redress.
The progress of our law toward the ideal of completeness is no
less pronounced today As Judge Ellis has well said .32
"It is the boast of our law that there can be no right
without a corresponding remedy When the right is once
created, the common law furnishes the remedy "
*=RAYmOND W CLIFFORD,
Of the Olympia Bar.
A well considered case involving the legal liability for flight over the
land of another is Swetland v. Curtiss Airports (Ohio), 41 Fed. (2d) 929(1930) See also Smith v. New England Aircraft Co. (Mass.), 170 N. E.
385 (1930)
113 Ed. I, Chap. 24, Sec. 2 (1285)
32 State ex rel. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v. Public Serv-
ice Commission, 94 Wash. 274, 287, 162 Pac. 523 (1917)
